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This article suggests that common arguments questioning the legitimacy 
of the first Brexit referendum prove flawed, as do certain others 
supporting the legitimacy of a second referendum. A different case for a 
second referendum is offered, that would have added to the legitimacy of 
the first, but the opportunity for which has now passed. Nevertheless, it 
might be legitimate to overturn the first referendum through a normal 
parliamentary process should there be a significant level of Bremorse 





The Brexit referendum has been distinguished by an absence of loser’s 
consent on the Remain side, and a parallel insistence that the result 
reflected the expression of ‘the people’s will’ against the elite minority on 
the Leave side. If the former dispute the legitimacy of the referendum and 
increasingly demand a second in the hope of reversing it, the latter retort 
that to dispute the first is itself illegitimate and a denial of popular 
sovereignty. 2 This short piece rehearses the normative arguments 
underlying each of these arguments. It leaves to one side the strictly legal 
and practical arguments, except to the extent they impact on the distinctly 
normative view of the legitimacy of either referendum. 
 
The analysis below adopts the dominant account of legitimacy among 
contemporary normative political theorists, and understands it as largely a 
matter of process rather than outcome (Buchanan 2002). On this account, 
a legitimate procedure is one that operates in a fair and impartial manner 
with regard to the different views and interests of the parties concerned.  
A majoritarian democratic process offers a paradigm case of such a 
legitimate procedure. As is the case within most constitutional 
democracies, the outcomes of even a legitimate process can be subject to 
certain side constraints, notably the need to uphold various individual 
rights. However, these constraints can be conceived in processual terms 
as originating in a requirement to consider all involved as entitled to have 
their views and interests treated with equal concern and respect. (cite 
Christiano on content independent account of legitimacy) 
 
From this perspective, many criticisms of the legitimacy of either the first 
or a possible second referendum prove flawed in shaping their arguments 
in the light of the outcome they favour. However, a successful procedural 
argument needs to be justified in general terms that could potentially 
legitimate an outcome one does not support. A balanced review of the 
arguments suggests neither side has an entirely knockdown case, so that 
neither the first nor a second referendum may be entirely legitimate or 
illegitimate, although for practical reasons time may already have run out 
for a second. 
 
 
WAS THE FIRST REFERENDUM LEGITIMATE? 
 
Two sets of arguments have figured prominently in questioning the 
normative legitimacy of the first referendum.3 The first set of arguments 
question the legitimacy of any referendum, and hence of the need for a 
second. On this view, it would suffice for the result to be overturned in an 
election or even a parliamentary vote. Advocates of this position view 
referenda as populist rather than genuinely democratic mechanisms, 
which invoke a mythical ‘will of the people’. They contend that the 
justification for democracy rests on any demos consisting of a plurality of 
individuals who reasonably disagree, with a democratic process providing 
a fair mechanism for arriving at a collective decision that is neutral 
between the views people may hold and so can treat them all impartially. 
A majority decision so conceived reflects at best the preferred option 
among various alternatives of most of those entitled to vote. In most 
cases, as in the case of the Brexit referendum, where the majority of 
51.89% on a participation rate of 72.21% represented just 37.4% of the 
electorate, it only reflects a plurality of those eligible to vote. 
Consequently, there was no sensible way to suggest that the result 
reflected the ‘will of the British people’. Indeed, the devolved regions 
argued that the UK included at least four demoi: those of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, as well as England. A case could even be made for 
suggesting that London, with a population almost as large as that of 
Scotland and Wales combined and devolved powers of its own, 
represented a fifth demos. Of these five, only two: Wales and England 
(minus London), voted to leave the EU. 
 A number of subsidiary arguments are presumed to follow from 
this general point. First, these critics note how in a general election, 
where voters indirectly influence the programmes of political parties and 
can directly choose between them, the EU issue has never been 
sufficiently salient to be an election winner. From the democratic point of 
view of getting a sense of where the majority preference lies, referenda 
have the normative disadvantage of falsely isolating one issue from its 
impact on others. Balanced against, and contextualised within, other 
issues, as is the case in a general election, leaving the EU would not 
necessarily command even a plurality of votes in most constituencies. For 
example, UKIP only managed to win one parliamentary seat at the last 
general election, largely on the back of the popularity of the incumbent 
MP, while Eurosceptic campaigns by the Conservatives in the 2001 and 
2005 elections had been largely ineffectual. Second, a referendum makes 
it hard to revise a policy in the light of changing circumstances and 
experience, or to hold decision-makers to account when their initiatives 
fail. Instead of incremental adjustments that reflect people’s evolving 
preferences, voters can express themselves at best only very sporadically. 
 When evaluating these arguments, it is important to distinguish 
between policy, constitutional and constitutive referenda (Tierney 2012: 
14). These arguments are particularly telling in the case of policy-
referenda, they are less so in the case of constitutional and, especially, 
constitutive referenda. Policy referenda assume an already constituted 
polity and regime, within which the various members of the demos agree 
to disagree about a range of issues. In such cases, isolating one issue from 
many could be regarded as failing to take into account the different 
rankings of a range of issues and of their interconnections that people 
might have. By contrast, certain constitutional and all constitutive issues 
are different. There may be other, liberal constitutional, reasons for 
arguing that a moral issue, such as abortion, ought not to be subject to a 
vote in the first place but rather be viewed as a right associated with 
woman’s autonomy. However, this argument obviously favours one of 
the positions in contention, and from a democratic point of view abortion 
could be seen as a matter on which there is reasonable disagreement from 
a plurality of moral perspectives but that is nevertheless both sufficiently 
discreet and important to be deserving of a distinct vote (Waldron 1999: 
112, 227). The case is even clearer with constitutive issues – that is, 
matters relating to the very existence and contours of the polity and its 
people, as in referenda regarding secession, or the character of its regime, 
as when a referendum is used to approve a new constitution. In these 
cases, the issue is a comprehensive one – whether a given group of 
people wish to form a demos or to settle their disagreements according to 
a given set of rules and procedures. In these cases, the standard 
arguments favouring a ‘normal’, constituted, democratic process, such as 
a general election, do not arise because what is at stake is whether such a 
procedure is itself appropriate. In such cases, it is more fitting to talk of 
popular sovereignty than in debates around policy because the vote 
relates to whether the individuals wish to form a demos of a sovereign 
polity or not (Tierney 2012: 296). 
 It might be argued that the EU referendum was as much about 
policy as polity, and hence was not truly constitutive. Certainly, the 
official Remain campaign defended their position in such terms in 
stressing the economic disadvantages of leaving the EU. However, the 
official Leave campaign stressed the constitutive issue of ‘Taking Back 
Control’. Seen in this light, the referendum becomes much more 
defensible, and parallels similar uses of referenda elsewhere and in the 
UK with regard to the possible secession of Scotland from the UK. 
Moreover, its procedural legitimacy ultimately rested on the commitment 
to hold it forming part of the governing Conservative Party’s general 
election campaign, while the form it took, discussed below - including the 
threshold for passing and the composition of the electorate - was 
legitimised by Parliament via a due legislative process. 
Even if the legitimacy of holding a referendum on this issue is 
granted, a second set of arguments come into play regarding its conduct. 
It has been argued that the campaign involved considerable 
misrepresentation by the Leave campaign, such as the notorious claim 
that membership cost the UK £350 million a week that could be spent on 
the National Health Service (NHS), and was too short given the technical 
issues involved, so that ordinary citizens lacked the information and time 
to evaluate them fully. The vote also has been seen as too close to be 
decisive; with critics claiming it ought to have required a super-majority. 
Meanwhile, EU citizens resident in the UK were said to be excluded 
unfairly from the vote, as were the younger generation of 16-18 year olds, 
who would bear most consequences of Brexit and overwhelmingly 
opposed it. 
Although all these points carry some weight, none – either singly 
or collectively - can be regarded as strong enough to delegitimise the 
referendum. Misleading information and spin abound in most elections. 
The electorate expects it and has access to plenty of alternative sources, 
not least an impartial public broadcaster in the BBC that ran a fact-check 
web site during the campaign. Although those supporting Remain level 
this complaint, their campaign was as much at fault as Leave’s in 
exaggerating the dire economic consequences of Brexit (for a balanced 
account of the campaign, see Clarke, Goodwin and Whitely 2017: Ch. 
3).4 Moreover, Britain’s membership of the EU has been debated with 
increasing intensity for the past 40 years – with people’s views 
remarkably stable over time (Clarke, Goodwin and Whitely 2017: Ch. 4). 
It can hardly be maintained that the electorate had too little time to 
become informed.  
Super-majority thresholds are often required for constitutional and 
constitutive referenda. For example, the 1979 referenda on devolution in 
Scotland and Wales required the approval of at least 40% of the eligible 
electorate rather than just a majority of those who voted, a threshold they 
failed to meet -  as did the Brexit referendum, as I noted above - although 
it was achieved by the 1975 referendum, which had a lower turn out 
(64.62%) but a higher majority in favour (67.23%). The argument 
favouring such criteria is that the (constitutional or quasi-constitutional) 
infrastructure of a polity should be relatively stable, particularly in those 
respects where it matters greatly for some members (perhaps a minority) 
in the society: for example, they have built their lives around the 
assumption that it will remain in place. Putting part of that infrastructure 
up for a 50-50 vote is like playing dice. This may be because there will 
always be some who vote against the status quo on the basis of frustration 
with the government on any front or because those affected will not 
realize, until it is too late, how badly they will be affected. For any such 
reason there will always be noise in the system, so to speak.5 I think this 
is an important consideration and will return to it in the next section 
dealing with a second referendum. However, I think a super-majority is 
an illegitimate way to address this point. For a super-majority violates a 
basic democratic and liberal norm that decision-making processes should 
be impartial and neutral between views in order to be fair (May 1952). 
Super-majorities entrench the status quo and may consequently lock in 
inefficient or unequal measures that generate injustices (Schwartzberg 
2013). 
 Finally, the first referendum excluded from the electorate both non-
British EU citizens resident in the UK and 16-18 year olds, although both 
had been included in the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014. 
Critics of this exclusion argue that it excluded those most directly 
affected by the proposal. They note that while those aged over 66, many 
of whom may never have to live with the consequences of their vote, 
divided 66-34 pro-Leave, the excluded younger generation, whose future 
will be profoundly shaped by Brexit, were 72-27 pro-Remain (Clarke, 
Goodwin and Whitely 2017, p. 155). Again, these are important 
objections. However, to carry the argument, these exclusions must be 
regarded as so unreasonable as to invalidate the referendum. However, I 
think a reasonable justification can be given for them.  
A distinction can be made between who can be legitimately 
included in making a decision, and the side-constraints that might arise 
with regard to those affected by a decision. In the case of a constitutive 
referendum, which concerns the very shape of the demos, a reasonable 
case can be made for restricting the decision to citizens. On the 
stakeholder account of political rights and obligations (Baubock 2015), 
the claim to being a citizen of a given sovereign political community 
belongs to those whose freedom and rights are inherently linked to the 
collective self-government and flourishing of this polity over time. This 
argument links citizenship rights to the performance of civic and social 
duties and a commitment to the political community and its members, 
including to future generations. On this view, rightful inclusion in the 
demos depends on assuming the obligations entailed by long-term 
membership of a community, not least by naturalising as a citizen of the 
host country.6 That said, EU citizens are certainly affected by the 
decision, and for any Brexit deal to be legitimate it should also be 
constrained in ways that acknowledge their legitimate expectations 
regarding their rights to remain – as the EU negotiators have justifiably 
insisted.  
With regard to the votes of the elderly vis-à-vis the young; there is 
a certain arbitrariness in deciding the age of majority. However, 18 is 
currently the European norm and not unreasonably so given it aligns with 
the end of compulsory school education in most states as well. Cohort 
injustices are possible, and some have even suggested disenfranchising 
the elderly from voting on certain issues (Van Parijis 1998). Still, the 
elderly tend to have children and grandchildren, so are not entirely 
without any concern for securing the interests of future generations, while 
a severe economic downturn as a result of Brexit is most likely to arise in 
the short term and directly affect their pensions and access to health care. 
 
 
WOULD A SECOND REFERENDUM BE LEGITIMATE? 
 
Even if the first referendum was legitimate, that does not mean a second 
one would not be justified as well. I start with two common but 
ultimately unconvincing arguments (a good overview of the debate can 
be found in Wheeler 2018), before turning to a third that I contend has 
greater normative merit.  
A first argument holds that if it was legitimate to revisit the 1975 
referendum, then surely the same can be said of 2016. I agree – the 
question is when would it be legitimate to do so? In the case of a policy 
referendum, it seems reasonable to revisit the decision in a relatively 
short time, as would be the case with ordinary legislation. However, with 
constitutive and constitutional referenda, which concern the basic 
political and legal framework, there is a need for continuity of a kind 
associated with the rule of law, whereby individuals can plan ahead. In 
these cases, it seems more appropriate to have a once in a generation 
vote, along the lines Thomas Jefferson (1984: 1402) advocated for 
ratification of the United States constitution. After all, both the EU and 
the composition of the UK demos were very different in 2016 from what 
they were in 1975, making a new say justified. Neither has changed today 
from the 2016 vote, and popular support for a second referendum seems 
minimal at best, with many antagonistic to the idea (Clarke, Goodwin and 
Whitely 2017: 215).  
Some retort that the first referendum failed to specify the type of 
Brexit that was to be negotiated, and that a second referendum would 
address this issue. However, this proposal proves harder to operationalize 
in a coherent manner than its proponents acknowledge. First, could a 
second referendum on the negotiations be legitimately organised? At the 
time of writing there are just 14 months to go before we leave the EU. 
The Electoral Commission (2016: 11, 15) recommends that legislation on 
the conduct of a referendum should be passed at least 6 months before the 
campaign starts and that the campaign itself should last at least 10, and 
possibly16, weeks. That suggests the rather unlikely scenario whereby the 
UK will have reached a deal in the next 6 months. Meanwhile, critics 
have a point in noting that the requirement that the ‘deal’ be subject to a 
second referendum to go through might bias the negotiations towards the 
EU offering a particularly ‘hard’ Brexit. Of course, that depends on what 
the question and its consequences would be. If the question was: ‘Do you 
accept the withdrawal agreement?’ would a ‘no’ vote mean to leave 
without a deal and revert to WTO rules, to return to the negotiations – but 
is there time to do that, or to remain by unilaterally revoking the 
triggering of Article 50? If the latter, can that be done if the first 
referendum was legitimate? And, say the EU wants to renegotiate the 
terms of the UK remaining, for example by cancelling the UK’s infamous 
rebate, would acceptance of that deal require a third referendum? 
An alternative and more principled argument for a second 
referendum, that also meets the reasoning behind a super-majority but in 
a way more consistent with democratic norms, is as follows. In his novel 
The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy Gentleman (1762: Vol VI, Ch. 
XVII), Laurence Sterne has Shandy, the novel’s narrator, report, 
misremembering Herodotus on Persian customs, that the ancient Goths of 
Germany took major decisions twice: first drunk and second sober, with 
only those drunken resolutions that met with sober approval being acted 
on. Shandy remarks that his father was much taken with this argument 
but being teetotal adapted it to involve discussing important domestic 
matters with his wife on the first Saturday night of the month and then on 
the following Sunday morning, referring to these two deliberative 
occasions as his ‘beds of justice’ (Waldron 2016: 76, 327 n. 29). 
Adapting this argument, it can be maintained that, for the reasons given 
earlier, decisions involving changing the very rules of the political game 
deserve to be considered especially carefully. At the same time, such 
consideration ought to respect democratic norms and allow all views to 
be fairly weighed and expressed. Balancing passionate frustration with 
the possible inadequacies of the status quo against reflective 
consideration of the consequences of changing it, potentially for an even 
worse arrangement, reflects a well established deliberative norm of 
‘hearing the other side’ that informs adversarial debate in Parliament and 
the Courts as well as normal elections. Indeed, Sterne’s ‘two bed’ 
argument has been employed to justify bicameralism, in which the second 
chamber acts as a scrutiny chamber, and could be equally employed to 
allow for judicial review (Waldron 2016: 77). This argument responds to 
the common criticisms of the first referendum while meeting the 
requirement noted at the start that an argument from legitimacy must 
reflect general considerations that derive from the general reasoning 
underlying constitutional democracy rather than being ad hoc arguments 
that reflect one’s view of the issue the referendum sought to decide. 
However, to not fall foul of the counter-arguments given above, a second 
referendum of this kind should have been called before triggering Article 
50 – allowing a period of reflection prior to taking that momentous step. 




This brief article has rejected arguments claiming the first referendum 
was illegitimate and suggested those commonly employed for supporting 
a second referendum might be so. Meanwhile, the moment has passed for 
a potentially legitimate second referendum. As someone who voted 
Remain, I find this conclusion distressing. But maybe it does not matter. 
In the UK parliament is sovereign and referenda advisory, while the 
narrow, passionate, first referendum has not been legitimised by a second, 
reflective, referendum. If buyer’s remorse was sufficiently widespread, it 
might be legitimate for a government with parliamentary support to pull 
back from Brexit and certainly to soften it. However, as yet there are few 
signs of Bremorse and little likelihood of it’s emerging any time soon, if 
at all. Given 401 of the UKs 632 constituencies voted Leave (Clarke, 
Goodwin and Whitely 2017: 227, 213), this scenario appears both 
unlikely to be viewed by MPs as politically feasible and of dubious 
legitimacy without a massive shift in public opinion in the near future and 
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Notes 
 
1  I’m grateful for comments from participants at the Oslo ECPR EPS Panel and 
Conferences on Referenda at the EUI and on Brexit at the University of Exeter and 
from Chris Brooke and Steven Klein, and to discussions with Richard Rose and 
Sandra Kröger. 
 
2 E.g. see reactions to the Government’s defeat in the Commons on 13/12/2017 in 
which Parliament insisted on a vote on the Brexit deal, in which the Foreign Secretary 




3  For a clear account of both, although he combines the two arguments, see Grayling 
2017, Appendix 1: Brexit, pp. 189-97. 
 
4 See too the report of the Electoral Commission, on the campaign (2016: 50-53), 
which rejects the need for a ‘truth’ Commission (2016: 3). 
 
5 I am grateful to Philip Pettit for the formulation of this point. 
 
6  Long-term resident EU citizens should be able, as at present, to become citizens of 
their host state with relative ease after a reasonable period of residence – which is 5 
years within the EU. But it also is justified that unless they are prepared to make the 
commitment to acquire this status they should be excluded from voting in national 
elections. See.Bauböck (2012). 
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